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ABSTRACT 
This study proposes a new method for modelling and analysing human-related accidents. It 
integrates HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System), which addresses 
most of the socio-technical system levels and offers a comprehensive failure taxonomy for 
analysing human errors, and AT (Activity Theory)-based approach, which provides an 
effective way for considering various contextual factors systematically in accident 
investigation. By combining them, the proposed method makes it more efficient to use the 
concepts and principles of AT. Additionally, it can help analysts use HFACS taxonomy more 
coherently to identify meaningful causal factors with a sound theoretical basis of human 
activities. Therefore, the proposed method can be effectively used to mitigate the limitations 
of traditional approaches to accident analysis, such as over-relying on a causality model and 
sticking to a root-cause, by making analysts look at an accident from a range of perspectives. 
To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed method, we conducted a case study in 
nuclear power plants. Through the case study, we could confirm that it would be a useful 
method for modelling and analysing human-related accidents, enabling analysts to identify a 
plausible set of causal factors efficiently in a methodical consideration of contextual 
backgrounds surrounding human activities. 
 
 
Keywords: Human error; Activity theory; HFACS; Accident analysis; Accident model 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Corresponding Author: 
Dong-Han Ham,  
(Tel: +82-62-530-1786) (Fax: +82-62-530-1789) (Email: donghan.ham@gmail.com; dhham@jnu.ac.kr)  
 
1Co-corresponding Author: 
Wan Chul Yoon,  
(Tel: +82-42-350-3119) (Fax: +82-42-350-1610) (Email: wcyoon@kaist.ac.kr; wcyoon@gmail.com)  
 
 
1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
An accident in a complex system can be defined as an undesired and unplanned (but not 
necessarily unexpected) event that leads to a specified level of loss (Leveson 1995). Thus, it is 
essential to prevent and manage accidents in a system effectively in order to enhance the 
safety of a system, which is the freedom from accidents or losses. However, it has been 
reported that human error is a key factor to the occurrence and progression of most of the 
significant accidents in complex and high-risk systems, such as nuclear power plants (NPPs) 
and air traffic control systems (Perrow 1999; Reason 2008; Shin 2014). Here it is meaningful 
to consider two different views of human error. One old view of human error regards human 
error as a cause of failure. Accordingly, in this view, human error is the cause of most 
accidents and the main threat to safety comes from the inherent unreliability of people in a 
system (Dekker 2002a). The other new view of human error regards human error not as a 
cause, but as a symptom of failure (Hollnagel 1998; Dekker 2002a). This view claims that 
human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside a system, and that human error is 
systematically connected to the features of people, tools, tasks, and operating environment. 
The view on human error or human (error)-related accidents in this study is in line with this 
new view. We can say that a thorough and valid analysis of human-related accidents is 
needed to prevent and reduce them, thereby enhancing system safety. However, unlike the 
analysis of an accident due to technical failures, human-related accident analysis has some 
difficulty in understanding the accident situation and extracting useful lessons-learned from 
the accident (Akyuz and Celik 2015; Dekker 2002b; Woods et al. 2010; Haslam et al., 2005). 
For example, the data on human-related accidents are typically elusive and qualitative. 
Moreover, problematic conditions and relevant causal factors cannot be directly observable 
in many cases, but they can be identified only through the analyst’s effortful reconstruction 
on the accident situation (Niwa 2009). 
Accident analysis methods have been developed to support analysts in conducting the 
four critical steps during accident investigation: (1) gathering information on an accident and 
documenting what actually happened based on different techniques, such as STEP 
(Sequentially Timed Events Plotting) (Hendrick and Benner 1986), (2) identifying contextual 
factors to be considered for characterizing a human-related accident, (3) understanding the 
accident situation by the use of identified contextual factors, and (4) determining a plausible 
causes of an accident through establishing reasonable cause-effect relationships based on the 
identified contextual factors and the understanding. In order to enhance the efficiency of 
accident investigation, most of the accident analysis methods offer a set of predetermined 
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causal factors or a taxonomy of failure types. With these features, accident analysis methods 
have been effectively used for investigating a human-related accident (e.g. INPO 1990; 
Kjellen 2000; Wiegmann and Shappell 2003; Svenson 2001; Woodcock et al. 2005). However, 
if a model of human activities in a system can be methodically used throughout the four 
steps in order to offer diverse perspectives on contextual backgrounds surrounding an 
accident, analysts would make the better use of accident analysis methods. As a set of 
predetermined causal factors are generally used in association with a linear, simplified 
causality model presumed in an accident analysis method, it is likely that analysts look at an 
accident only with causal factors and a causality model provided by a method, without 
considering other meaningful contextual factors (Shorrock et al. 2014). This limitation would 
be supplemented by using a model of human activities. Additionally, if we can establish a 
theoretical basis for explaining why and how pre-specified causal factors in accident analysis 
methods are derived and for understanding their interrelationships systematically, it would 
be used as another effective leverage for modelling and analysing a human-related accident. 
Recently, a new approach to modelling and analysing human-related accidents based on 
activity theory (AT) has been developed to address those issues described above in our 
previous work (Yoon et al. 2016). The usefulness of this approach has been demonstrated in 
several case studies in the domain of NPPs. These case studies showed that the new 
approach was helpful for analysts to produce a more comprehensive, meaningful set of 
contextual factors systematically, which cannot easily be obtained by using existing methods, 
in consideration of holistic backgrounds of human activity based on the concepts of AT. It 
was also found that it could be more advantageous than other analysis methods that offer 
predefined set of causal factors or none of them, in the process of identifying plausible causal 
factors for a human-related accident under investigation. Additionally, AT could be 
effectively served as a theoretical basis for explaining why a set of causal factors need to be 
considered and for specifying how those factors and their interrelationships should be 
interpreted.  
Although the AT-based method has several advantages for analysing human-related 
accidents in comparison with existing methods, it has also some limitations. Particularly, 
there is a limitation in the scope of contextual factors that can be considered by the use of the 
method. An accident analysis method needs to address all of the hierarchical levels of socio-
technical systems (Leveson 2011; Salmon et al. 2011; Stanton et al. 2013). However, it is not 
easy to identify some kinds of contextual factors such as physical environment or external 
factors of macro-level such as the effects of a regulatory body by the use of the method. As 
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understood from a disastrous accident such as the Chernobyl accident, those factors and 
their relationships with other factors (e.g. the design of hardware) are significant in the 
examination of an accident in a complex system. Thus it is necessary to broaden the scope of 
contextual factors that can be considered by using the method. And it is also necessary to 
improve the usability of the method, especially in the process of identifying a set of causal 
factors. It is surely a good advantage that the AT-based method forces analysts to look for a 
range of contextual factors comprehensively, not only relying on a predetermined set of 
causal factors. However, if a predetermined set of causal factors can be provided, analysts 
can examine an accident initially with these factors and then more easily expand the scope of 
causal factors to be considered with the concepts and principles of AT. This would enhance 
the practicality of the AT-based approach. 
There exist some analysis methods that are effective in looking for contextual factors and 
offer a pre-specified set of causal factors. Thus, it is a viable approach to integrate the AT-
based method and an existing method. Of those existing methods, which can supplement the 
limitations of the AT-based method, Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) would be a good choice as it is currently one of the most popular methods for 
analysing human errors and addresses comprehensive contextual factors. HFACS is a 
systems-based accident analysis method, which enables a comprehensive analysis on most of 
the levels of socio-technical systems. Furthermore, it is highly usable because it is simple to 
learn and simple to use (Salmon et al. 2011; Baysari et al. 2009). This aspect may be the most 
attractive feature from the perspective of safety practitioners working in the industry 
(Underwood and Waterson 2013, 2014). Therefore, a cross-fertilization between the two 
methods (HFACS and the AT-based method) seems to be a good way for developing a more 
useful approach to analysing human-related accidents. 
In order to address this issue, this study aims to propose a new method for modelling and 
analysing human-related accidents, which integrates two methods (HFACS and the AT-
based method) by embedding the concepts and principles of AT into HFACS. AT can be 
served as a useful theoretical framework for understanding and modelling human activities 
and their performance in successful system conditions as well as accidental situations. For 
this reason, the proposed method has a potential to surmount the limitations of traditional 
approaches to accident investigation as well.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes research backgrounds on HFACS, 
AT, and the AT-based method. Section 3 describes the proposed method, by focusing on the 
process of accident modelling and investigation and the integration of the failure taxonomy 
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provided by HFACS and contextual factors identified by using the AT-based method. 
Section 4 demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed method through a case study in the 
domain of NPPs. Section 5 describes a set of requirements to be addressed in a method for 
analysing accidents and discusses the benefits of using the proposed approach in relation to 
those requirements. Finally, section 6 summarizes this study and suggests future research 
topics. 
 
2. Research background 
2.1 HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System) 
HFACS is one of the well-known methods for human-related accident analysis, which was 
developed based on Reason’s framework of human-related accident causation (or Swiss 
cheese model). As shown in Fig. 1, HFACS provides a consistent structure (i.e. taxonomy) to 
describe human erroneous activities and relevant causal factors at the four hierarchical levels 
in a system, such as unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and 
organizational influences (Wiegmann and Shappell 2003). HFACS has been applied to 
multiple domains including aviation, rail transport, maritime, healthcare, and discussed in 
numerous studies on accident analysis (Shappell and Wiegmann 2000, 2006, 2007; ElBardissi 
et al. 2007; Patterson and Shappell 2010; O’Connor and Walker 2011; Chauvin et al. 2013; 
Mitchell et al. 2016)). Following the concept of Swiss cheese model, HFACS leads accident 
analysts to investigate an accident in consideration of two types of failures: active failures at 
the level of unsafe acts and latent failures at the other three levels. A causation model 
assumed in HFACS is as follows: an active failure at the level of unsafe acts is influenced by 
a latent failure at the next level-preconditions for unsafe acts, a latent failure at the level of 
preconditions for unsafe acts is caused by a latent failure at the next level-unsafe supervision, 
and so on. Especially, as intra- or inter-analyst reliability has been validated repeatedly 
through several studies (Li and Harris 2006; O’Connor 2008; Olsen 2011; Cohen et al. 2015; 
Ergai et al. 2016), it is expected that HFACS will be reliably used for analysing human-
related accidents in a range of work domains.  
However, HFACS has also some limitations for thorough and valid accident analysis 
(Olsen and Shorrock 2010; Salmon et al. 2011). First, HFACS analysis can be constrained by 
the taxonomy. The analysis is just fitting of the collected data into the categories within the 
taxonomy rather than exploring the contextual data on the accident as a whole. Thus, some 
problems and relevant causal factors may not be addressed during accident analysis. 
Furthermore, when the identified problems or causal factors do not fit neatly into one of the 
 
 
5 
 
 
categories provided by HFACS taxonomy, analysts often force the identified data to fit into 
one of the options in the taxonomy (Salmon et al. 2012). Second, the taxonomy was 
developed based on analysing a set of accident data, but it was not based on theoretically 
sound model on human activity in a work system. In addition to this, it was reported that 
some causal factor categories cause confusion among analysts when conducting causal factor 
mapping during accident analysis (Baysari et al. 2008; Olsen 2011). Thus, it is needed that the 
taxonomy should be defined more specifically to avoid misinterpretation among analysts. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to improve the way of selecting and mapping causal factor 
categories by providing a theoretical basis on the derivation of a set of causal factors and 
their interrelationships (Yoon et al. 2016).  
 
 
<Fig. 1. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework 
(Wiegmann and Shappell 2003)> 
 
Some researchers have tried to extend the original HFACS framework to overcome some 
limitations described above (Reinach and Viale 2006; Harris and Li 2011; Chen et al. 2013). 
For example, Rienach and Viale (2006) developed HFACS-RR by adding a new top-most 
level ‘outside factors’ into the framework. They extended the HFACE framework to address 
regulatory environment as a meaningful causal factor category in a railroad industry. Harris 
and Li (2011) proposed HFACS-STAMP to deal with open system characteristics such as 
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errors promulgating across organizational boundaries in civil aviation industry. Chen et al. 
(2013) developed HFACS-MA as follows: First, it integrated Reason’s Generic Error 
Modelling System (GEMS) to define the contents of errors within ‘unsafe act’ level. Second, it 
adopted Hawkins’s SHEL model to define the categories within ‘precondition for unsafe 
acts’ level. Third, it also added a new top-most level ‘external factor’ into the framework.  
 
2.2 Activity Theory (AT) 
Activity theory (AT), which is also known as cultural historical activity theory (CHAT), 
provides a broad theoretical framework for describing the structure, development, and 
context of human activity (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003; Rogers 2004). AT is rooted in the 
works of the Russian psychologist Vygotsky (Vygotsky 1978; Engeström 1987) and has been 
applied mainly for the design framework for computer supported cooperative work (CSCW) 
(Nardi 1996; Kaptelinin et al. 1999). Although its main application area was the design of 
CSCW, it has also been used for diverse problems, including elicitation of software 
requirements (Martins and Daltrini 1999), evaluation of system dependability (Sujan et al. 
2000), design and evaluation of IT systems in terms of usability (Gay and Hembrooke 2004), 
evaluation of user experience in an educational game (Law and Sun 2012), evaluation of 
interaction in virtual environment (Roussou et al. 2008), development of a framework for 
interaction design (Kaptelinin and Nardi 2006), and development of a framework for 
information systems research (Crawford and Hasan 2006).  
AT was also used as a theoretical basis for improving the safety of system. Bedny and 
Harris (2013) introduced a safety and reliability analysis method based on systemic-
structural activity theory, which is derived from general activity theory. It is useful to 
identify design deficiencies in terms of safety in the early stages of a design process; however, 
it is not a method for analysing human-related accidents. AT has been used for 
characterizing human activities in an organizational context in accident investigation as well 
(Nuutinen and Norros 2009; Holt and Morris 1993). Particularly, the study of Holt and 
Morris (1993) indicated the possibility of AT as a useful tool for modelling and analysing 
human-related accidents. However, little attention has been given to the development of a 
practical and procedural approach for modelling human-related accidents and for 
investigating the plausible causes of accidents, on the basis of AT.  
One thing to note is that AT should be mainly used for describing or explaining human 
behaviour in a context, rather than for predicting the process or outcome of human 
behaviour. AT points out that an isolated human being is not appropriate for the unit of 
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human behaviour analysis (Nardi 1996). Instead it aims at understanding human behaviour 
in a broader context. It offers a broad conceptual basis for considering contextual factors 
influencing human behaviour as well (Kaptelinin et al. 1999). AT suggests that a minimal 
meaningful context for human behaviour should be included in the unit of analysis. For this 
purpose, AT introduces a new term called ‘activity’ (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003); that is, an 
activity should be the basic unit of human behaviour analysis.  
The original model of human activity states that every human activity can be described by 
triadic relationship between a subject and an object (or purpose) mediated by tools or 
artefacts. AT claims that we cannot pull these three elements (subject, object, and tool) apart 
without violating the core essence of human activity (Leont’ev 1978). The studies on AT have 
realized that human behaviour should be understood in a more comprehensive context; thus 
three more elements (community, division of labour, and rule) were incorporated in order to 
expand the original model (Bertelsen and Bødker 2003; Engeström 1987). The expanded 
model of human activity is called an activity system and is represented as an activity triangle 
shown in Fig. 2. The meaning of the six elements of activity system are described in Fig. 2. 
The upper part of activity system composed of subject, tools, and object represents an 
individualized and goal-oriented action involved in an activity. The lower part of activity 
system consisting of rules, community, and division of labour represents the collective and 
social nature of an activity. 
 
Tools
Subject Object
Rule Division of laborCommunity
Physical things, representations, and 
systems of symbols (e.g. language and sign) 
that a subject uses to accomplish an activity
Person or people engaged in 
activity who are the focus of a study
Immediate 
goals of activity
Outcome
Long-term 
goals of activity
Motives
Purposes, reasons 
for the activity
Laws, codes, conventions, customs, 
and agreements that community 
members adhere to while engaging 
in the activity
People who shares knowledge, 
interests, stakes, and goals to 
accomplish an activity
How the works in an activity are 
divided among participants in an 
activity
 
<Fig. 2. Elements of activity system model (adapted from Kain and Wardle 2014, p. 277)> 
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It is interesting to consider activity system in terms of three aspects: interacting elements, 
types of interaction (interrelationship), and mediating elements. The three main interacting 
elements are: subject, object, and community. The interaction between the two of these three 
elements results in the three main types of interaction: subject-object, subject-community, 
and community-object. These three types of interaction are mediated by the three elements: 
tools for interaction between subject and object, rules for interaction between subject and 
community, and division of labour for interaction between community and object.  
The theoretical bases of AT are framed by five basic principles for understanding human 
activities: (1) object-orientedness, (2) hierarchical structure of activity, (3) internalization and 
externalization, (4) tool mediation, and (5) historical development (Kaptelinin et al. 1999).  
 First, the principle of object-orientedness states that every human activity is 
purposeful and directed toward something (object). For example, a new house can be 
an object of an architect’s activity. As described above, an object could be physical 
things in real world or ideal concepts in human mind. Thus, a newly established 
knowledge structure of students can be an object of a teacher’s activity.  
 Second, the principle of hierarchical structure of human activity emphasizes that 
human activities can be described at various abstraction levels. An activity is carried 
out through actions, accomplishing objective results. Actions are governed by the 
conscious goals of the subject. Goals reflect the objective results of actions. Actions can 
be regarded as the similar concept to tasks in the literature of human-computer 
interaction (HCI) (Kaptelinin et al. 1999; Khosla et al. 2003). Actions are realized 
through series of operations that are conducted without conscious thinking. 
Operations refer to an unconscious, automatic process, and it depends on the 
conditions under which an action is carried out. It can be said that the nature of 
hierarchical structure is not a whole-part relationship but a behavioural goal-means 
relationship. When an action is repeatedly conducted and thus routinized, it can be 
transformed into an operation because it can be performed in an unconscious way. In 
contrast, it is also possible that an operation can become an action when there is a 
change in activity system and thus a previous unconscious operation cannot be done 
any more (e.g. introduction of new tools). In this case, the operation should be 
performed with a conscious goal, which becomes an action.  
 Third, AT makes a distinction between internal and external activities. Internal 
activities refer to cognitive activities happening inside the head (e.g. counting 
numbers in the head), whereas external activities mean cognitive activities conducted 
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outside the head (e.g. counting numbers with fingers). The principle of internalization 
and externalization points out that each of them cannot be understood if it is analysed 
separately from the other one, because there is a constant transformation between 
internal and external activities in carrying out an activity. Such a constant 
transformation forms a basis for human cognition and activity.  
 Fourth, the principle of tool mediation explains how cultural factors and the 
interaction between human and environment can be reflected in the use of tools. In 
general, a tool reflects the previous experience of other people who have already 
attempted to solve similar problems or have devised more efficient methods for using 
it. The reflection of such an experience can be considered in two ways: (1) the 
structural properties of a tool, which can be developed into its affordance, and (2) the 
knowledge about when and how a tool should be used.  
 Fifth, the principle of historical development claims that human activities are all 
reformed and reshaped through historical development, and are open to further 
development as well. If an element or an interaction in an activity system changes, the 
activity system becomes unstable and accordingly makes adjustments in order to 
return to stable states. This principle is also related to the understanding of how tools 
are used as usage unfolds over time. This principle emphasizes that it is necessary to 
focus on how the purpose of the use of tools changes along with changes in actual 
objects and in ways of using tools (why, what, and how).  
 
 
<Fig. 3. The classification of contradiction in activity theory (adapted from Turner and 
Turner 2001, p. 3)> 
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Regarding the dynamics described above, AT uses the concept of disturbance and 
contradiction to describe and analyse the in-depth problems related to human activities 
(Gedera and Williams 2013). Contradiction is historically accumulated structural tensions 
within and between activity systems (Engeström 1987), and manifests itself as disturbances, 
such as problems, ruptures, and breakdowns. As shown in Fig. 3, contradictions are 
categorized into four types: primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary (Turner and Turner 
2001). Each of them indicates the misfit within an element of an activity system, the misfit 
between two elements, the misfit between different developmental phases of an activity, and 
the misfit between different concurrent activities (Engeström 1987). The primary 
contradiction happens when there is a mismatch within an element of an activity system. In 
practice, this contradiction can be understood in terms of tension between the best possible 
states of an element and what may be actually implemented or employed with time and 
resources available. An example of this contradiction is that a novice operator is allocated to 
work situations because of certain constraints where an expert operator should be allocated 
in principle (contradiction at subject). The primary contradiction is sometimes latent and 
manifests itself in the secondary contradictions taking the form of concrete tensions between 
elements of an activity system. The secondary contradiction occurs when two interacting 
elements mismatch. For example, this contradiction can happen between a human operator’s 
understanding of how a device works and the actual workings of the device (contradiction 
between subject and tool). Usually, tensions related to the secondary contradiction can be 
resolved by introducing new elements into activity system in order to reconfigure it. This 
new introduction can result in the tertiary contradiction. The tertiary contradiction can be 
found when an activity is reformulated to take account of new motives or ways of working. 
It happens when there are misfits between different developmental phases of an activity 
system. For example, when a new task procedure is introduced to achieve works more 
efficiently, it is possible that they have difficulty following the newly introduced task 
procedure, because human operators are accustomed to work with old task procedures, 
(contradiction between two phases of the same activity for conducting something by the use 
of task procedure). Lastly, the quaternary contradiction takes place in the interaction 
between two coexisting or concurrent activities. An example of the quaternary contradiction 
may be found in the interaction between the two activity systems: an activity system that 
human operators would like to manage their mental stress level, and another activity system 
that instructors would like to deliver as much knowledge and skills as possible to human 
operators within a specified time period. 
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2.3 AT-based accident analysis 
Recently, a new method for modelling and analysing human-related accidents based on AT 
has been developed in our previous work (Yoon et al. 2016). The AT-based method is 
composed of four stages: data collection, preliminary analysis, in-depth analysis, and 
recommendations of corrective actions. The two core analysis activities are preliminary 
analysis and in-depth analysis. In the preliminary analysis, analysts need to model human-
related accident situations by the use of activity system model. In this stage, analysts identify 
surface problems, which mean the problematic elements of an accident as well as human 
errors involved in an accident. For this, the collective consideration of the six perspectives of 
activity system model helps analysts understand an accident in the comprehensive 
contextual backgrounds of a human activity. In the in-depth analysis, analysts attempt to 
identify in-depth problems, which refer to the causal factors resulting in human errors or 
problematic situations involved in the sequence of events, by using the four types of 
contradictions in AT. In terms of activity system model, in-depth problems are related to the 
contradictions.  
As described in the introduction, the usefulness of this method has been demonstrated in 
several case studies in the domain of NPPs. From the case studies, it was found that the new 
method supported analysts in producing a more comprehensive, meaningful set of 
contextual factors systematically, which cannot easily be obtained by using existing methods. 
Additionally, it was confirmed that AT could be effectively used as a theoretical basis for 
explaining why a set of causal factors need to be considered and for specifying how those 
factors and their interrelationships should be interpreted.  
It was also found that it could be more advantageous than other analysis methods that 
offer predefined set of causal factors or none of them, in the process of identifying plausible 
causal factors for a human-related accident under investigation. When analysts too much 
depend on a predefined set of contextual factors, it is likely that they make a premature 
judgement on causal factors without a deep consideration of a range of contextual 
backgrounds surrounding a human-related accident. In contrast, when analysts identify 
plausible causal factors without any predefined set of contextual factors, they can take 
account of various contextual factors. However, in this case, it is likely that the process of 
discerning contextual factors may be unsystematic and inefficient, and there may be no 
meaningful relationships among the identified contextual factors. The AT-based method can 
be an effective alternative to overcome the limitations of the two different approaches to 
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identifying a set of contextual factors. It does not put any restrictions on looking for a set of 
contextual factors because it does not force analysts to stick to a predefined set of contextual 
factors. However, it leads analysts to consider a range of contextual factors and their 
interrelationships systematically on the basis of human activity system models related to the 
accident, which can be developed by the use of concepts and principles of AT. As a result, a 
set of contextual factors and their interrelationships identified by using the AT-based method 
can be interpreted with a theoretically sound model of human activities. 
 
2.4 Research motivation 
As shown in the study of Yoon et al. (2016), AT can be usefully used as a theoretical 
framework for modelling and analysing human-related accidents. In spite of several relative 
advantages of the AT-based method in comparison to existing methods, it has some 
drawbacks to be considered. As described previously, there is a limitation in the scope of 
contextual factors that can be considered by using the method. For example, it can be 
difficult for analysts to take account of some kinds of factors (e.g. physical environmental 
factors and the effects of a regulatory body) when they look at an accident based on human 
activity system model. Considering that an accident analysis method should deal with all of 
the hierarchical levels of socio-technical systems (Leveson 2011; Salmon et al. 2011), this 
limitation should be supplemented to improve the usefulness of the method. Another 
limitation to overcome lies in the usability of the method in the process of identifying a set of 
causal factors. When determining plausible causes for an accident in the use of the method, 
analysts can look for a range of contextual factors comprehensively and systematically by 
considering human activity system models and their related contradictions, without only 
depending on a predetermined set of causal factors. However, if a preliminary set of causal 
factors can be provided, which are linked to the elements and relations within or between 
activity system models, the process of using the method would be more efficient. In this case, 
analysts can investigate an accident initially with the pre-specified causal factors and then 
more easily look for other causal factors to be considered with the concepts and principles of 
AT. As a result, this would enhance the practicality of the AT-based method.   
In order to supplement those limitations, this study aims to integrate HFACS and the AT-
based method, by embedding the concepts and principles of AT into HFACS. This 
integration is a viable approach because HFACS provides a set of causal factors (the 
taxonomy of failure types) at each four levels and addresses most of the hierarchical levels of 
a socio-technical system. Another good point is the fact that HFACS is currently one of the 
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most popular methods for analysing human errors. Additionally, it has been reported that 
HFACS is highly usable because it is simple to learn and simple to use (Salmon et al. 2011; 
Baysari et al. 2009), and this aspect may be the most attractive feature from the perspective of 
safety practitioners working in the industry (Underwood and Waterson 2013). Therefore, a 
cross-fertilization between the two methods (HFACS and the AT-based method) seems to be 
a good way for developing a more useful approach to analysing human-related accidents. 
As stated above, embedding the concepts and principles of AT into HFACS would 
complement the limitations of the AT-based method, making the most of the advantages of 
HFACS. However, we can expect more benefits of this integration in relation to the 
shortcomings of traditional approaches to accident analysis, which have been strongly 
pointed out in the introduction of a new paradigm of system safety called Safety-II 
(Hollnagel et al. 2013). Some of those drawbacks include: (1) an oversimplified approach that 
identifies linear, simple cause-effect relationships, (2) looking for plausible causal factors 
only based on a causation model assumed in a method for analysing accidents, and (3) 
neglecting other possible causes by over-relying on a root cause (Hollnagel 2014; Shorrock et 
al. 2014). As the interaction between human and system is increasingly complex and 
dynamic, it is more likely that we can experience human-related accidents that cannot be 
sufficiently investigated with traditional approaches, thereby exposing those drawbacks. 
Therefore, traditional accident analysis methods need to be complemented to mitigate them, 
and new accident analysis methods reflecting the concepts of Safety-II need to be developed 
as well (Hollnagel 2014).  
In this regard, it is interesting to look at how the FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method) (Hollnagel 2012; Patriarca and Bergström 2017), which is a system modelling tool 
for reflecting the concepts of Safety-II, addresses those shortcomings. In particular, of those 
three weak points, the first two drawbacks are well addressed in the FRAM. The FRAM 
mitigates the first drawback by introducing the concept of functional resonance and by 
stipulating that an accident happens in an emergent manner (results from the dynamic 
interactions between contextual factors and performance variability of work functions). In 
addition, the FRAM does not assume any accident causation model; it is just a method for 
modelling a socio-technical system that explains how a system works. Thus it does not 
enforce accident analysts to depend on a causation model blindly to identify a plausible set 
of causal factors. This is how it mitigates the second drawback above.  
However, it is expected that the integration of AT and HFACS (particularly the AT-based 
method) can also be a promising approach to overcome the limitations of traditional 
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approaches. The three drawbacks above can be supplemented as follows. Firstly, the AT-
based method claims that an accident needs to be examined from the perspectives of six 
elements constituting an activity system and their dynamic interactions (contradictions). This 
means that the AT-based method encourages accident analyst to reject the view that an 
accident can be reasonably understood in terms of a linear cause-effect relationship, thereby 
mitigating the first drawback above. Secondly, the AT-based method does not assume any 
accident causation model, like the FRAM; it can be used as a method for describing human 
activities with their contextual backgrounds in a system. This point would be helpful to 
overcome the second drawback. Thirdly, the AT-based approach encourages analysts to look 
at human-related accident situations with broad perspectives in order to consider as many 
different possible causal factors as possible, which can be meaningful to an accident under 
investigation. Thus we can say that the AT-based method would be useful for analysts to 
overcome the third shortcoming.  
One should not think that traditional approaches are useless due to their weak points. In 
spite of those shortcomings, traditional approaches are still useful in accident modelling and 
investigation. However, we should also note that there is a growing number of accidents in 
modern complex systems where traditional approaches cannot be effectively used (Hollnagel 
2016). For this reason, accident analysts should always keep in mind the limitations of 
traditional approaches and make an attempt to overcome them. Thus, we can say that it is 
desirable to develop a method that can support the use of traditional approaches to accident 
investigation as well as help analysts avoid their drawbacks. We will examine whether or not 
the new method proposed in this study can be an answer to this research issue. 
To sum up, the purpose of this study is to propose a new method that integrates HFACS 
and the AT-based method, thereby enhancing the practicality of AT-based approach to 
modelling and analysing human-related accidents. Moreover, the proposed method is 
expected to have a potential to overcome some drawbacks of traditional approaches. This 
potential of the proposed method will be examined as well. 
 
3. The proposed method 
The proposed method presents a methodological framework to describe various contextual 
factors of human-related accidents by combining HFACS (particularly, the failure taxonomy) 
and the AT-based method (particularly, AT-based modelling and analysis of activities). As 
shown in Fig. 4, the basic approach is to describe activities and their interrelationships before 
determining plausible causes of a human-related accident. The relationships among activities 
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within the same time zone are represented with solid lines, but the relationships among 
activities located in different time zones are represented with dotted lines. Moreover, the 
four types of contradictions embedded within and between activities become a basis for 
identifying a set of plausible causes of an accident. The contradictions are color-coded orange 
in this paper (Fig. 3 & Fig. 7).  
In order to help accident analysts more efficiently derive a set of problematic contextual 
factors for understanding a human-related accident and determine a set of plausible causal 
factors for the accident, the proposed method recommends them to use the failure taxonomy 
of HFACS and the performance shaping factors (PSFs) matching table shown in Appendix A. 
The PSFs matching table provides the links between the elements of activity system model 
and their corresponding PSFs (i.e. probable causal factors for an accident). The PSFs 
matching table can be used to help analysts to examine another candidate of causal factors 
which are not included in HFACS taxonomy as well. The PSFs matching table in Appendix A 
offers some examples of PSFs for the elements of activity system model. However, it should 
be noted that they are not a complete set; instead they need to be regarded as typical 
examples of PSFs for the elements of activity system model.  
Performance shaping factors (PSFs) refer to the factors that affect human performance in a 
system (Swain and Guttman 1983). It seems that PSF is a term more frequently used in 
human reliability analysis (HRA) rather than human-related accident analysis. Considering 
the meaning of PSFs, we can say that the concept of PSFs is similar to the concept of 
contextual factors. However, although PSFs can also include any factors increasing human 
reliability (decreasing the likelihood of human errors), the more widely accepted meaning of 
PSFs in accident investigation seems to be closer to the factors affecting human performance 
in a way that caused the error of interest (Salmon et al. 2011; Shorrock and Kirwan 2002). 
This is the reason why we used the term the PSFs matching table, rather than the term the 
contextual factors matching table. Obviously, there can be a range of PSFs that influence 
human performance in a variable manner, thereby affecting the likelihood of human error 
(Hollnagel 1998). Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider PSFs that have the most effect on 
performance in the accident analysis and risk assessment. In general, if a PSF is believed to 
contribute to the occurrence of a human-related accident under investigation, it can be 
regarded as a plausible causal factor for the accident.  
The overall process of the proposed approach consists of the four stages: data collection 
and initial review of accident, preliminary analysis, in-depth analysis, and recommendation 
(Fig. 5). The more detailed description of these four stages are as follows. 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
<Fig. 4. Accident analysis framework of the proposed method> 
 
 
 
<Fig. 5. The overall process of the proposed method> 
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Step 1: Data Collection and Initial Review of Accident 
As with most of the existing methods, data collection is the first and most important step for 
analysing a human-related accident. It is necessary to collect suitable data on an accident 
comprehensively for understanding the whole picture of the accident situation. Analysts 
usually start with some initial data such as summarized report on accident, and try to collect 
additional data to reconstruct the situation around an accident using some reference 
information such as event & alarm records. In addition, analysts should identify human 
activities shown in the initial representation of the accident scenario. Although the data 
should be collected as abundantly as possible at the initial trial, additional data also need to 
be collected continuously throughout the entire process of accident analysis. The data 
collection process can be supported with activity system models. An activity system model is 
used as a template with the six perspectives for collecting comprehensive data on the 
situation of an accident. 
 
Step 2: Preliminary Analysis 
The second step is to conduct preliminary analysis with the data gathered in the previous 
step. First of all, analysts identify surface problems (or disturbances), which refer to 
problematic elements (e.g. technological aspects, environmental aspects, etc.) involved in an 
accident as well as unsafe acts or unsafe supervisions. A popular practice in accident analysis 
is to use the event and causal factor (E&CF) chart in order to identify and describe these 
surface problems. The E&CF chart can aggregate the data on accident situation in a simple 
manner, and provide an intuitive explanation on linear sequence of events and causal factors 
(i.e. linear cause-effect relationships) involved in the progression of an accident. However, 
the E&CF chart can be ineffective for identifying surface problems from multiple 
perspectives as well as further looking for more specific types of problems. Thus, we 
recommend the use of activity system model and HFACS taxonomy for identifying and 
describing surface problems. As shown in Table 1, a surface problem should be described on 
activity itself that needs to be analysed. In addition, more specific surface problems of an 
accident can be identified from the six different perspectives, each of which respectively 
corresponds to the six main elements of activity system model. Although outcome and 
motive are represented in the description of an activity system, they are not the main 
elements of an activity system model that need to be considered to understand human 
activities in a context. Thus they are not further considered in the analysis of human-related 
accidents based on the AT-based method. Here the probable causal factors shown in the PSFs 
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matching table in Appendix A can be effectively used for identifying surface problems. 
Furthermore, the failure taxonomy of HFACS, which provides a detailed classification on the 
types of unsafe acts or unsafe supervisions, can be useful referential information for this 
process as well. For example, let’s suppose that an operator made a mistake which 
manipulated a wrong valve during a maintenance work (disturbance: activity). In this 
situation, the operator could be a worker with weak mental states (disturbance: subject). 
Besides, the step of the valve line-up for the maintenance could be described ambiguously in 
the maintenance procedure (disturbance: tool). Referring to this information, analysts can 
determine this erroneous action as ‘decision error’ with HFACS taxonomy. When analysts 
make the best use of HFACS taxonomy and the PSFs matching table in this step 2, they can 
efficiently establish a set of rough, initial contextual factors and then conceive a likely 
tentative accident mechanism or scenario with those established factors. The application of 
HFACS taxonomy can give a more detailed information to surface problems identified by the 
use of activity system model as well, which helps analysts characterize surface problems 
more specifically. 
 
<Table 1. Multiple perspectives on surface problems (or disturbances)> 
 
Disturbance Types Definition 
Activity Unsafe acts or unsafe supervisions (consequence) involved in the sequence of events 
Subject Subjects involved in the activity and their unsafe actions; Personal background related to the unsafe actions 
Tool Problems of the tool used by the subject when performing the unsafe action 
Object Problems related to the object of the activity 
Rule Problems of the explicit or implicit norms, code of conduct used in the community 
Community Problems related to the group or participants of the activity 
Division of Labour Problems related to division of responsibility, communication and coordination among members of the community 
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<Table 2. Classification of in-depth problems (or contradictions)> 
 
Contradiction Types Definition 
Primary 
contradiction 
Misfit within the elements of an activity system (e.g. subject, tool, 
rule, etc.) 
Secondary 
contradiction 
Misfit between the elements of an activity system (e.g. subject-tool, 
etc.) 
Tertiary 
contradiction 
Misfit between different developmental phase of an activity system 
(e.g. activity A (time-1) - activity A (time-2), etc.) 
Quaternary 
contradiction 
Misfit between coexisting or concurrent different activity system 
(e.g. activity A – activity B, etc.) 
 
Step 3: In-depth Analysis 
In this step, analysts conduct in-depth analysis to examine and uncover more in-depth 
problems (or contradictions), which result in unsafe acts or unsafe supervisions as well as 
problematic situations involved in accident progression. As shown in Table 2, in-depth 
problems are embedded within and between activity systems and classified into four types: 
primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary contradictions. Before identifying in-depth 
problems, it is necessary to build more extended activity system models which cover the 
whole hierarchical structure of HFACS. Activity system models are built by updating the 
initial activity system models established in the previous step. After that, analysts identify in-
depth problems based on the extended activity system models which were described on the 
layers of the hierarchical structure of HFACS. Finally, analysts select relevant causal factors 
from HFACS taxonomy by considering identified in-depth problems. In this step, accident 
analysts can also effectively refer to the probable causal factors shown in the PSFs matching 
table to determine a set of causal factors, by associating the elements of activity system 
model with HFACS taxonomy. Some examples of probable causal factors related to the 
contractions in Table 2 are also offered in the PSFs matching table. For example, let’s suppose 
that analysts identified some subject-related contradictions as in-depth problems (e.g. 
primary contradiction on subject, secondary contraction between subject and other elements, 
etc.) for unsafe acts. For these contradictions, analysts can select some causal factors such as 
personality (subject), job satisfaction level (subject-object), knowledge and skills of using 
tools, equipment and procedures (subject-tool) from the PSFs matching table. However, it 
should be again noted that the causal factors shown in the PSFs matching table in Appendix 
A are not complete; they are just the examples of the probable causal factors corresponding 
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to the elements of the activity system. They can serve only as a referential basis for 
identifying a set of causal factors. Thus they need to be expanded and refined continuously.  
 
Step 4: Recommendation 
Lastly, corrective actions are recommended based on the results of the previous analyses. 
When developing corrective actions, analysts should consider the problems and relevant 
causal factors as well as the whole picture of the interrelationships among activity systems. 
In addition, analysts should take account of a set of identified causes and their cost-benefit 
trade-offs together. Furthermore, analysts need to acknowledge the possibility of unexpected 
side effects that may result from implementing corrective actions. These potential problems 
can be addressed with the help of activity system model (i.e. tertiary contradiction). For 
example, when a mandatory job rotation in key areas of an organization is considered as a 
corrective action against the problem of corruption, the potential effect can be examined 
roughly based on the tertiary contradiction between current activity systems and more 
advanced activity systems after applying the corrective action. Based on the tertiary 
contradiction, analysts can anticipate another issues (e.g. staffing and qualification, workload, 
professionalism, etc.) in the new activity system. 
 
4. Case study 
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method, we conducted a case study of 
analysing a human-related accident that occurred in Korean NPPs. This case is the re-
examination of a human-related accident that was investigated previously (KINS, 2014). 
During the investigation of the accident, we collected the relevant information by reviewing 
some documents and interviewing four plant personnel who conducted the surveillance test 
of the automatic seismic trip system (ASTS) and four personnel working in the sub-
contractors who developed the ASTS. Four plant personnel include two operators (one shift 
supervisor and one reactor operator) who had worked more than ten years as the operator 
and two test personnel who had more than five years’ experience as the instrumentation and 
control (I&C) engineer. All of the four personnel working in the sub-contractors had more 
than ten years’ experience in the field of I&C system development. For the re-analysis of the 
accident, we interviewed another three plant personnel (i.e., one engineer who installed the 
ASTS at the NPP where the unplanned reactor trip occurred, and two another engineers who 
installed the ASTS at another two NPPs around the same time), who were not interviewed at 
that time. They had worked around four years as the I&C engineer. We used unstructured 
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interview method, and spent one or two hours for each of the interviews. The interviews 
were recorded by using a voice recorder, and then the interview transcripts were made. 
These interview data were analysed by using the concept underlying the proposed method. 
This means that the six elements constituting an activity system and four types of 
contradictions were used as analysis grid in the analysis of the interview data. Moreover, the 
result of the accident analysis was compared with those examined by other methods such as 
HFACS (Wiegmann and Shappell 2003) and the AT-based method (Yoon et al. 2016) used in 
the previous study. 
 
 
(a) A functional relationship between ASTS and relevant components in NPP 
 
 
(b) The sequence of events 
<Fig. 6. A simplified reconstruction of the unplanned reactor trip event> 
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4.1 Event description 
The abnormal event occurred during a 6-month surveillance test of the ASTS. The ASTS was 
installed in the NPPs in Korea as one of the post-Fukushima action items. The ASTS is the 
supplemental system that scram the reactor swiftly to cope with potential risks after extreme 
earthquake. The ASTS consists of two redundant trip channels. Each channel of the ASTS 
determines the trip (i.e. open) of each output breaker of the Motor-Generator (M-G) sets, 
which supply electrical power to the rod control system. Removing the electrical power from 
the rod control system makes the control rod assembly drop into the reactor core (Figure 6 
(a)). 
The surveillance test was started with placing the bypass switch on the maintenance and 
test panel (MTP) into the bypass position to block the inadequate trip signal during the test. 
After finishing the test for the channel No. 1 of the ASTS, and while performing the test for 
the channel No. 2 of the ASTS, the control rods suddenly dropped, and as a result, the 
reactor was scrammed automatically. The drop of the control rods was due to the 
inadvertent open of all M-G set output breakers. The M-G set output breakers were opened 
due to human errors by the operators and test personnel, combined with a technical design 
defect, which is the inoperability of the bypass switch on the MTP of the ASTS. Moreover, 
while performing the test on the channel No. 1 of the ASTS, the channel No. 1 trip signal was 
indicated on the alarm windows in main control room, and on the information display of the 
MTP. However, the operators and test personnel could not acknowledge the abnormal 
situation (i.e. the trip of channel No. 1) and continuously carry out the next stage on the 
channel No. 2. As a result, both of the M-G set output breakers were opened unintentionally 
during the test (Fig. 6 (b)). 
 
4.2 The analysis results using the proposed method 
4.2.1 Results of preliminary analysis 
We identified three surface problems (or disturbances) such as two human errors (D1 and 
D2) and one latent condition (D3). These surface problems were described with star-marks 
and activity system models (Fig. 7). As an initial building of activity system model, we made 
two activity system models which represent the activities of test personnel and operators. 
After that, we assigned specific failure categories onto each surface problems with HFACS 
taxonomy. In summary, the surface problems were identified and described with HFACS 
taxonomy as shown in Table 3. 
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<Table 3. The surface problems identified using the proposed method> 
 
 Failure types Relevant information & activity system model 
D1 Perceptual errors 
Test personnel failed to detect the abnormal situation (activity) 
- The status of channel trip was indicated on MTP display, but 
it disappeared within 1 second (tool) 
D2 Decision errors 
Operators saw the alarm occurrence, but failed to recognise it 
as an abnormal situation and to share the information with test 
personnel (activity) 
- The alarm was cleared when an operator pushed the button 
of ‘acknowledge’ and ‘reset’ (tool) 
D3 Technological failures 
The bypass switch on the MTP has been inoperable due to 
design deficiency (tool) 
 
 
<Fig. 7. Accident analysis using the proposed method> 
 
4.2.2 Results of in-depth analysis 
For the surface problems described above, we built more extended activity system models 
and conducted in-depth analysis to identify specific causal factors (Fig. 7). First, we 
identified that the test personnel’s human error (D1) was resulted from two primary 
contradictions, such as the design deficiency of MTP display (tool) and inadequate 
cooperation with operators (div. of labour). In addition, we identified a quaternary 
contradiction; that is the scope of human factors design review (tool-another activity). The 
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MTP display had the function of indicating the status of channel trip of the ASTS. However, 
this design feature did not contribute to acknowledge the channel trip of ASTS. The reason 
was that the indication of channel trip was displayed, but suddenly disappeared from the 
MTP display within less than 1 second. Thus, the test personnel could not acknowledge the 
abnormal situation during the test. This problem is also related to the quaternary 
contradiction that is the scope of human factors design review. Until recent years, the scope 
of human factors design review was restricted to main control room of the nuclear power 
plant. The MTP display was installed in the electrical equipment room (EER) outside of main 
control room, thus human factors principle was not integrated into the design of MTP 
display. Besides, the test personnel could be supported to recognize the abnormal situation 
by the operators who continuously monitored whether or not the alarm occurred. However, 
the operators did not stop the test process or share the information of alarm occurrence with 
the test personnel. This is another primary contradiction. 
Second, we identified that operators’ human error (D2) was influenced from one primary 
contradiction such as procedure or document deficiency related to alarm logic (tool), and 
two secondary contradictions such as knowledge deficiency related to alarm logic and 
response (subject-tool) and a sense of responsibility to cooperate with test personnel (subject-
rule). In this case, the operator understood that an alarm would be displayed on alarm 
window when triggering the channel trip of ASTS. However, he confused which alarm 
would be displayed, so he focused on another alarm window irrelevant to the channel trip of 
ASTS. Furthermore, he directed attention to another alarm occurrence in an abnormal 
situation, so he failed to recognize the alarm of channel trip of ASTS as a real situation. When 
he pushed the button of ‘acknowledge’ and ‘reset’, the alarm was cleared. As the result, the 
operator believed that the alarm was a false signal. Thus, the operator did not perform any 
action and also did not share the situation with test personnel. We identified that the 
operator’s knowledge deficiency was due to some confusable description of alarm response 
procedure. 
Third, we identified that the latent inoperability of the bypass switch on the MTP (D3) 
could be traced back to the installation stage of the ASTS about three years ago. Although the 
installation of the ASTS was completed, the ASTS was not connected to the M-G set to verify 
whether or not the functionality of the ASTS is stable until recent time. Thus, the design 
problem remained unnoticed for long time. Although the NPP-A (i.e. the NPP in which the 
unplanned reactor trip occurred) was the first case to design and install the ASTS, the 
installation of the ASTS was also carried out at another two NPPs (i.e. NPP-B and NPP-C) 
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around the same time. Unfortunately, the NPP-A failed to identify and correct the design 
deficiency of the bypass switch, but NPP-B and NPP-C successfully identified and corrected 
the latent design problem. Ironically, the I&C engineers in the NPP-A were more qualified 
persons with more job experience in the technical area in comparison with the I&C engineers 
in the NPP-B and NPP-C. We identified that the failure of design review and correction was 
influenced from two primary contradictions such as relatively tight schedule for installation 
of the ASTS (object) and insufficient support from other professionals (div. of labour) and 
two quaternary contradiction such as forcing to meet the tight schedule from the upper 
levels of the organization (object-another activity) and design implementation and 
experience feedback related to the prior installation of the ASTS (div. of labour-another 
activity). The I&C engineers, who were responsible for installing the ASTS at NPP-A, had not 
enough time to review and test the ASTS during the installation stage. Furthermore, they 
were busy due to another more important project such as power uprate which increases the 
licensed thermal power limit, but they could not be supported to relieve their workload by 
other professionals in the NPP. Moreover, the design deficiency was successfully identified 
and corrected by the I&C engineers in NPP-B and NPP-C. Especially, the I&C engineers in 
NPP-B swiftly shared their experience of identifying the design deficiency of the ASTS with 
other I&C engineers in other NPPs using an unofficial channel such as email. However, the 
I&C engineers in NPP-A moved to another job positions after installing the ASTS, and the 
successful experience of dealing with the design deficiency of the ASTS was not transferred 
to the I&C engineers’  successors in NPP-A. In summary, we could identify the in-depth 
problems shown in Table 4, referring to HFACS taxonomy and the PSFs matching table.  
 
<Table 4. The in-depth problems identified using the proposed method> 
 
 No Plausible causal factors Relevant information & activity system model 
D1 
1 (Some part of) usability of tools or equipment 
- The MTP display had a human factors design 
deficiency (tool) 
2 Design control of tools or equipment 
- The MTP display was not included in the scope 
of human factors design review (tool-another 
activity) 
3 Adequacy of coordination and communication 
- There was not suitable cooperation between 
operators and test personnel (div. of labour) 
D2 
4 Technical correctness of procedures/documents 
- There was some deficiency related alarm logic 
among technical documents (tool) 
5 
Knowledge and skills of 
using tools/equipment/ 
procedures 
- The operator had inadequate knowledge on 
alarm logic (subject-tool) 
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 No Plausible causal factors Relevant information & activity system model 
6 Sense of responsibility 
- There was not sufficient sense of responsibility 
to cooperate between operators and test 
personnel (subject-rule) 
D3 
7 Task characteristics - The installation of the ASTS was conducted with a relatively tight schedule (object) 
8 Adequacy of coordination and communication 
- The cooperation between the I&C engineer and 
other professionals was not effective for the 
design review of the ASTS (div. of labour) 
9 Adequacy of work planning or control 
- The post-Fukushima action plan was 
announced with the relatively tight schedule 
(object-another activity) 
10 
Adequacy of protocols or 
methods for 
communication and 
instruction 
- The communication between the I&C engineer 
at NPP-B and the I&C engineers at other NPPs 
was not effective to reflect the prior experience of 
identifying and correcting the design problem 
(div. of labour-another activity) 
11 Adequacy of policy and guidance 
- The progress of implementing post-Fukushima 
action plan was considered as important criteria 
for rating the performance of the company (rule) 
- It was forced the NPP workers to meet the 
schedule established by headquarter office (rule) 
 
4.3 Comparison with the individual use of HFACS and AT-based approach 
An accident analysis was previously conducted to the same case by using the AT-based 
approach and HFACS individually (Yoon et al. 2016). The analysis results were summarised 
in Table 5. The analysis results using HFACS show similar results with those obtained from 
AT-based approach. However, HFACS and the AT-based approach had some relative 
advantages or limitations for accident analysis. HFACS was useful to characterize error types 
and causal factors more specifically and reliably than the AT-based approach. However, 
some causal factors could not be addressed by the use of HFACS when compared with those 
obtained with the AT-based approach. For example, as shown in Table 5, work management 
of implementing post-Fukushima action items was not considered as a causal factor during 
HFACS analysis. Moreover, some causal factors such as procedure or knowledge-related 
aspects were not predefined in HFACS taxonomy, thus they could not be identified as causal 
factors during HFACS analysis. In contrast to this, some causal factors (e.g. inadequate 
training to operators) were forced to be identified when conducting HFACS analysis. These 
supervisory-related factors can be picked up from the analysts’ hindsight views as with other 
analysis methods. However, we could not find any clear evidences to support this judgement 
when conducting AT-based analysis. 
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The comparison between Table 4 and Table 5 indicated that the proposed method 
identified additional in-depth problems more coherently, which were not addressed as 
causal factors in the previous analysis. Especially, there were some contributing factors from 
the upper levels of the organizational structure. These influences were related to the levels of 
corporate leadership and NPP management. For example, the headquarter office established 
the fixed schedule of post-Fukushima action plan without enough review and 
communication with the NPP managers. Moreover, it was announced that the progress of 
implementing post-Fukushima action plan would be evaluated as one of important rating 
criteria for the company. Thus, this quick and easy decision-making led to the unexpected 
excessive demand for the installation activity of the ASTS in the first NPP (i.e. NPP-A) which 
was prescribed in the schedule. 
 
<Table 5. The analysis results using HFACS and AT-based approach (Yoon et al. 2016)> 
 
 HFACS analysis & relevant 
information AT-based analysis & relevant information 
D1 
<Level 2> 
■ Technological environment 
- Design deficiency of MTP display 
and alarm logic 
■  Design deficiency of MTP display 
□ The scope of human factors design review 
□ Inadequate cooperation with operators 
<Level 1> 
■ Perceptual errors 
- Test personnel’s failure of 
detecting the abnormal situation 
from MTP display 
■ Test personnel failed to detect the abnormal 
situation 
D2 
<Level 3> 
√ Inadequate supervision 
- Inadequate training to operators 
- 
<Level 2> 
√ Adverse mental states 
- Operator’s inattention or situation 
awareness failure 
■ Crew resource management 
- Communication deficiency 
between operators and test 
personnel on the abnormal 
situation 
□ Knowledge deficiency related to alarm logic 
and response 
■ Cooperation with test personnel 
□ Procedure or document deficiency related to 
alarm logic 
<Level 1> 
■ Decision errors 
- Operator’s failure of recognising 
the alarm occurrence as abnormal 
situation and sharing the 
information to test personnel 
■ Operating shift personnel saw the alarm 
occurrence, but failed to recognise it as an 
abnormal situation and to share the 
information with test personnel 
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 HFACS analysis & relevant 
information AT-based analysis & relevant information 
D3 
<Level 4> 
■ Organizational process 
- Inadequate design review and 
experience feedback about design 
deficiency 
■ Experience feedback related to the prior 
installation of the ASTS 
□ Work management of implementing post-
Fukushima action items 
<Level 3> 
- 
□ Work management of implementing post-
Fukushima action items 
<Level 2> 
- 
□ The bypass switch on the MTP has been 
inoperable due to design deficiency 
 
(Notes) ■: matched between HFACS analysis and AT-based analysis, □: not-matched 
between HFACS analysis and AT-based analysis, √: not-matched and wrong results 
 
The results of this case study showed that the use of the proposed method could have 
unique advantages in comparison with the individual use of HFACS or the AT-based 
approach. First, the AT-based approach described the interaction among activities with just 
one dimension of ‘relevance’. However, the proposed approach represents the relations 
among activities with three kinds of dimensions such as vertical relationship between 
activities across the layers of HFACS, horizontal relationship between activities within a 
layer of HFACS, and temporally influencing relationship between activities. Thus, analysts 
can understand the relationships between activities involved in an accident situation more 
comprehensively. Especially, historical and organizational background of an accident can be 
clearly represented and used for accident analysis. Second, HFACS assumes the top-down 
causality in the hierarchical structure of an organization. Thus, it constrains that accident 
analysis should be conducted through a bottom-up process by starting the lowest level such 
as unsafe acts. However, the proposed approach does not put any constraint to the flow of 
causality in the hierarchical structure; it does not enforce analysts to investigate an accident 
by using only the causality relationship. Although the proposed approach adopts the process 
of starting with surface problems and moving to in-depth problems, the surfaces problems 
do not necessarily have to be unsafe acts (i.e. HFACS Level 1). It is allowed that the surface 
problems can be also preconditions of unsafe acts (i.e. HFACS Level 2) or unsafe supervision 
(i.e. HFACS Level 3).   
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5. Discussion 
We have found that HFACS could be effectively used for supplementing the AT-based 
approach to accident analysis with its failure taxonomy and broad coverage of hierarchical 
levels of a system. As the failure taxonomy of HFACS serves as an initial set of candidate 
causal factors, analysts can relatively easily diagnose an accident and conceive the most 
probable causes on the basis of the failure categories. This is surely a good point in terms of 
the efficiency of accident investigation. HFACS addresses most of the hierarchical levels of a 
system, excepting only the highest level (i.e. government and local authorities). This is also a 
good point in that HFACS makes analysts look at an accident from the perspectives of the 
three levels (a single human worker, a group of workers, and an organization) and their 
interactions in a balanced way. HFACS can be effectively used for supplementing the 
limitations of the AT-based method with those features described above. 
However, it should be noted that the mechanical use of HFACS without considering its 
shortcomings can make it difficult for analysts to escape from the limitations of traditional 
approaches to accident investigation. As described in section 2.4, the critical limitations of 
traditional approaches include: (1) an oversimplified approach that identifies linear, simple 
cause-effect relationships, (2) looking for plausible causal factors only based on a causation 
model assumed in a method for analysing accidents, and (3) neglecting other possible causes 
by over-relying on a root cause (Hollnagel 2014; Shorrock et al. 2014). As HFACS was 
developed based on the concept of Swiss cheese model, it enforces analysts to diagnose an 
accident in consideration of two types of failures: active failures and latent failures. In 
relation to this, a causation model is assumed in HFACS. The causation model is as follows: 
an active failure at the level of unsafe acts is affected by latent failures of the next higher level, 
and these latent failures are again influenced by latent failures of the next higher level, and 
so on. Thus, if analysts look for a probable set of causal factors by rote by the use of the 
causation model and its related failure classifications in HFACS, it is likely that they fall into 
the drawbacks of traditional approaches to accident investigation. 
While HFACS can supplement the weak points of the AT-based approach, the concepts 
and principles of AT can also be usefully used for complementing those drawbacks 
described above. We should note that AT is not a causation model for accident analysis, but 
can be used as a method for describing human activities with their contextual backgrounds 
in a system. The AT-based approach encourages analysts to look at human-related accident 
situations with diverse perspectives and to consider as many different probable causal 
factors as possible, which can be meaningful to an accident under investigation. For that 
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reason, AT can be effectively used as a theoretical framework for overcoming (or at least 
lessening) the drawbacks of traditional approaches to accident investigation. As Hollnagel 
(2012) pointed out, the limitations of traditional accident analysis methods come from their 
underlying causation models, even though a causation model can enhance the efficiency of 
accident investigation. He emphasizes the importance of developing a method that does not 
presume a causation model. Thus, we can find a good advantage of the AT-based method in 
that it does not rely on an accident causation model but can be used as a method for 
modelling human activities in every situation, as explained above.  
As we discussed above, the integration of HFACS and the AT-based method is 
meaningful in that each of them can be effectively used for supplementing the drawbacks of 
the other. As a result, in comparison to the individual use of each method, the method 
proposed in this study can be more effectively used for accident investigation. Considering 
the features of the proposed method and the findings of the case study, we can say that it can 
make analysts enjoy the benefits of traditional approaches to accident investigation as well as 
help them avoid the drawbacks of traditional approaches. 
However, we can discuss other benefits of using the proposed method in relation to the 
introduction of a new paradigm on system safety (Safety-II) and the comparison between it 
and traditional approaches. In the currently dominating safety paradigm (Safety-I), safety is 
defined as the condition where the number of adverse outcomes (accidents and incidents) is 
as low as possible. Thus, the main goal of traditional approaches to accident investigation is 
to determine a set of plausible causes and to fix them (find and fix approach) (Hollnagel 
2014). As described above, the new safety paradigm indicated that traditional approaches 
suffer from the following three shortcomings, in spite of their usefulness in many accident 
investigations: (1) they attempt to diagnose an accident with a linear, simple cause-effect 
relationships, (2) they generally assume a causation model and attempt to explain an 
accident investigation based on the model, and (3) they strive to look for a root cause and 
tend to neglect other possible causes once a root cause is found. In addition, the following 
three more points can also be regarded as the limitations of traditional approaches: (4) they 
try to understand an accident with a pre-specified set of causal factors linked to a presumed 
causation model, (5) they have a stance that all adverse outcomes have their unique, 
respective causes, and (6) they are inclined to seek human errors and regard them as root 
causes (Hollnagel 2012; 2014; Hollnagel et al. 2013; Shorrock et al. 2014). 
In spite of those drawbacks, it is sure that traditional approaches can still be effectively 
used for accident investigation in many cases. However, the new safety paradigm pointed 
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out that there are increasing number of accidents in modern complex systems, which cannot 
be effectively investigated by the use of traditional approaches because of their shortcomings 
(Shirali et al. 2016). Therefore, in order to supplement the shortcomings, it presents a 
different way of looking at safety and accidents. It defines safety as the condition where the 
number of successful outcomes is as high as possible. With this viewpoint in mind, the new 
safety paradigm emphasizes the following alternative viewpoints: (1) an accident analysis 
method should admit that an accident cannot be explained by linear, simple cause-effect 
relationships, (2) an accident needs to be investigated without too much relying on an 
accident causation model, (3) an accident is not so simple that it can be sufficiently explained 
only with a root-cause, (4) it should be acknowledged that the currently assumed set of 
causal factors may not be actual causes of the accident and that other contextual factors 
assumed not to be problematic may be actual causes, (5) the causes of successful outcomes 
and adverse outcomes are not different but the same, and (6) an accident analysis method 
should focus on the performance variability in terms of resource demands and resources 
available in the situation of an accident, instead of human errors (Leonhardt et al. 2009; 
Hollnagel 2012; 2014; Hollnagel et al. 2013; Shorrock et al. 2014). These six alternative 
viewpoints correspond, in order, to the six drawbacks of traditional approaches above.  
However, the last two points need to be explained in more detail. It is natural that people 
perceive current work demands and adjust their performance to meet the demands by 
actively looking for and using currently available resources (e.g. procedures, their 
knowledge and skills, and collaborators’ knowledge and skills, etc.). This phenomenon is 
called performance adjustment or performance variability. It is inevitable and necessary for 
the safe operation of modern complex socio-technical systems (Besnard and Greathead 2003). 
An interesting point is that the result of such a performance adjustment can be successful or 
unsuccessful, depending on the given condition. It is thus reasonable to think that successful 
outcomes and adverse outcomes have the same origin. These two points are well reflected in 
FRAM that was developed in order to realize the concepts and principles of the new safety 
paradigm.  
Here, we should keep in mind that the traditional approaches to accident investigation as 
well as the new safety paradigm are all needed to enhance system safety. An accident 
analysis method needs to make the most of advantages of both of them. It is therefore 
necessary to develop a method that can support the use of traditional approaches as well as 
help analysts escape from the limitations of traditional approaches. For this, based on the 
review of literatures, we summarized the twelve requirements that should be addressed in 
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accident analysis methods (Table 6). Of those requirements, seven requirements (the sixth to 
the twelfth requirements) are based on the alternative viewpoints of the new safety 
paradigm, which are explained above. More specifically, the sixth to the eleventh 
requirements are in order related to the first to the sixth alternative viewpoints of the new 
safety paradigms, and the twelfth requirement is connected to the sixth alternative viewpoint.  
However, the requirements of Table 6 can be regarded as evaluation criteria for accident 
analysis methods as well. We can discuss the characteristics and advantages of using the 
method proposed in this study, by taking account of these requirements. The rightmost 
column of Table 6 describes how and how well the proposed method dealt with these 
requirements. Although the proposed method does not fully address all of the requirements, 
we can claim that it has several good points and gives insights for developing a more 
advanced accident analysis method.  
 
<Table 6. Requirements to be addressed in a method, and the way and the degree that the 
proposed method addressed> 
 
No Requirements to be addressed  (in a method for accident analysis) 
The way and the degree that the 
proposed method addressed 
1 
As an accident model or causation model 
underpinning a method makes accident 
analysis more efficient, a method should 
have a model that specifies a set of causal 
relations (Hollnagel 2012). 
It employs a causation model 
underpinning HFACS. 
(Fully addressed) 
2 
In order to exhaustively describe 
accidents, the unit of analysis should be 
the entire complex sociotechnical 
systems (Svedung and Rasmussen 2002; 
Salmon et al. 2011). 
Its scope of analysis is the same as that of 
HFACS, which covers most of the levels, 
excepting the higher levels beyond 
organization. 
(Partially addressed) 
3 
If a method offers a range of failure 
classifications, analysts can easily 
associate plausible causes for an accident 
being investigated with a set of causal 
factors (it would be beneficial in terms of 
efficiency of analysis) (Wiegmann and 
Shapell 2001; Hollnagel 2012). 
It makes the most of failure 
classifications specified in HFACS. 
(Fully addressed) 
4 
A set of failure classifications (or causal 
factors) of a method should be defined 
on the basis of a sound theory or 
framework on human activities or 
human-related accidents (Ferjencik 2011; 
Yoon et al. 2016). 
There is no grounded theory for the 
failure taxonomy of HFACS; AT may be 
served as a theoretical basis for this. 
However, this point was not studied well 
in this study.  
(Partially addressed) 
5 
A method should be scale invariant in 
order that it can be used for any scale of 
accidents, no matter what they are low-
The concepts and principles of AT can be 
used in the same way for each level of 
HFACS. 
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No Requirements to be addressed  (in a method for accident analysis) 
The way and the degree that the 
proposed method addressed 
level failures or high-level failures 
(Hollnagel 2012). 
(Fully addressed) 
6 
A method should allow accident analysts 
to admit that some accidents cannot be 
explained in terms of causality 
relationships between decomposed 
functions or components of a system in 
consideration (i.e. they are emergent, not 
resultant from causality) (Hollnagel et al. 
2013; Shorrock et al. 2014). 
Although it does not explicitly address 
the process of how an accident emerges, 
it fully admits that some accidents 
cannot be explained by cause-effect 
relationships.  
(Fully addressed) 
7 
As a causality model underlying a 
method generally restricts the use of a 
method, a method always looks at all 
accidents with a set of predefined 
assumptions and causality relationships 
of the model. To overcome this 
limitation, a method should not depend 
on a causality model too much 
(Leonhardt et al. 2009; Hollnagel 2014; 
2016). 
It uses the causation model of HFACS 
(the relationships between active failures 
and latent failures); however, it does not 
follow the causation model blindly. It 
assists analysts to identify other ways 
(not the causation model) for 
understanding an accident particularly 
through in-depth analysis based on AT. 
(Fully addressed) 
8 
A method should encourage accident 
analysts not to take a single root-cause 
approach and thus to identify as many 
likely causes as possible thoroughly 
(Lundberg et al. 2010; Ferjencik 2011; 
Hollnagel 2014). 
HFACS and the AT-based method all do 
not follow a single root-cause approach; 
they encourage analysts to look for as 
many probable causes as possible. 
(Fully addressed) 
9 
The same manifested failures can happen 
with different causes and mechanisms. 
Thus a method should not make accident 
analysts to think by rote that the same 
manifested failures have the same causes 
and mechanisms (Lundbert et al. 2010). 
This requirement is addressed in it; the 
AT-based approach claims that the same 
surface problems in preliminary analysis 
can be associated with different causal 
factors in in-depth analysis. 
(Fully addressed) 
10 
A method should reflect the idea that 
successful outcomes and unacceptable 
outcomes have the same origin; This 
means that a method should help 
accident analysts avoid their hindsight 
bias (Hollnagel 2014; Shorrock 2014; 
Patterson and Deutsch 2015). 
In order to help analysts avoid hindsight, 
it enforces them to look for other 
probable causes by using AT. 
(Partially addressed) 
11 
A method should reflect the 
phenomenon that human workers 
always attempt to adjust their 
performance to meet current working 
demands by the use of available 
resources. In order to reflect this, a 
method should enable accident analysts 
to consider a meaningful set of 
contextual factors when examining an 
Although it does not address the 
performance variability in a detailed 
manner, it enables analysts to consider a 
meaningful set of contextual factors 
systematically on the basis of human 
activity system models and their relevant 
contradictions. 
(Not addressed) 
 
 
34 
 
 
No Requirements to be addressed  (in a method for accident analysis) 
The way and the degree that the 
proposed method addressed 
accident situation (Dekker 2002a; 
Hollnagel 2009; 2012; 2016; Woltjer et al. 
2015). 
12 
There may be other types of causes 
rather than human errors for explaining 
human-related accidents. Thus a method 
should not make accident analysts to 
think that identifying plausible human 
errors for an accident is the ultimate goal 
of accident analysis (Reason 1997; 
Hollnagel 2014). 
HFACS and the AT-based method all 
have a stance that there are other types of 
failures, rather than human errors, which 
can be regarded as actual causes of an 
accident. 
(Fully addressed) 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This study proposed a new approach for modelling and analysing human-related accidents 
by integrating HFACS and the AT-based approach. In this proposed method, the failure 
taxonomy and the scope of analysis in HFACS are usefully used for supplementing the 
limitations of the AT-based approach. Thus, the proposed method addressed most of the 
hierarchical levels of complex sociotechnical systems as a unit of analysis and provided a set 
of causal factors, enabling analysts to identify a plausible set of causal factors efficiently. 
However, the mechanical use of HFACS taxonomy without a systematic consideration of 
human activities and their contextual backgrounds makes it suffer from the drawbacks of 
traditional approaches to accident investigation. The concepts and principles of AT, which 
form the basis of the AT-based approach, can be usefully used for complementing the 
drawbacks. We can therefore say that the proposed method has the following advantages in 
accident investigation: (1) it encourages accident analysts to think that an accident can 
happen in various ways and thus to consider a human-related accident from multiple 
perspectives, (2) it helps accident analysts to look for as many different causal factors as 
possible without too much depending on a causality model and a predetermined set of 
causal factors, and (3) it encourages accident analysts to avoid sticking to the identified root 
cause and instead to look for other probable causes actively in consideration of human 
activities in a context. In this regard, it can be said that the proposed method shows the 
synergistic effects of HFACS and the AT-based approach, and that it has several promising 
features for realizing the concepts and principles of the new safety paradigm. With the 
features described above, the proposed method would be a useful method for safety 
practitioners working in the industry. 
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However, there are some points to consider in order to enhance the practicality of the 
proposed method. Firstly, it is worth considering the reliability and the validity of the 
proposed method, which are not well addressed in this paper. Reliability is concerned with 
random error; thus it refers to the consistency or dependability of a measurement and is 
concerned with the consistency of the results obtained from the measurement (Higgins and 
Starub 2004; Marczyk et al. 2005). Validity is related to systematic error; thus it refers to what 
the measurement measures and how well it does so (Higgins and Starub 2004; Marczyk et al. 
2005). It seeks to answer the question: ‘‘does the measurement measure what is supposed to 
measure?’’ Accordingly, when an accident analysis method or model is developed, its 
reliability and validity need to be systematically examined. However, it is known that 
assessing them (particularly validity) can be a very difficult and overwhelming task 
(Wiegmann and Shappell 2003). For this reason, not too much work has been done to 
investigate them for accident analysis methods (Salmon et al. 2011). Nonetheless, checking 
the reliability and the validity of the proposed method can be an important process for 
securing its theoretical soundness and practicality.  
There are different types of reliability and validity. However, interrater reliability and two 
types of validity (content validity and construct validity) would be the most meaningful to 
the method proposed in this study. Interrater reliability is used to determine the agreement 
between different judges when they observe or evaluate the performance of others. Therefore, 
for accident analysis methods, interrater reliability is used to assess the level of agreement 
between different analysts when they examine the same accident by using the method. 
Content validity generally evaluates the extent to which a measuring instrument covers a 
representative sample of the domain of behaviours to be measured (Jackson 2009). In the case 
of accident analysis methods, we can say that content validity refers to whether a method 
adequately covers the human-related accident domain to be measured. In other words, it 
measures how well a method captures a range of ways that a human-related accident can 
happen. Construct validity assesses the degree to which a measuring instrument accurately 
measures a theoretical construct or trait that it is designed to measure (Jackson 2009). When 
it is applied to accident analysis methods, it can refer to how well a method characterizes a 
human-related accident and identifies a plausible set of causes for the accident. There are 
several approaches for determining construct validity. However, these approaches focus on 
the extent to which the measurement of a certain construct converges or diverges with the 
measurement of similar or different constructs (Marczyk et al. 2005). 
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In the case of HFACS, there are several studies reporting its acceptable and high interrater 
reliability (Wiegmann and Shappell 2003). The proposed method recommends analysts to 
use the PSFs matching table when they investigate a human-related accident; this can be 
useful for reducing the disagreement between the causal factors discerned by analysts. 
However, the proposed method integrating HFACS and the AT-based method has not been 
yet tested empirically in terms of interrater reliability; thus it remains as an issue to be 
further studied. Regarding the content validity of the proposed method, we cannot say with 
a full confidence that the proposed method covers all of the ways that a human-related 
accident can happen. In addition, as HFACS taxonomy does not address the highest level (i.e. 
government and local authorities) in a socio-technical system hierarchy, it can be said that it 
does not have a full coverage for examining an accident in terms of a socio-technical system 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, it can be said that its content validity is not so low that its 
practicality is significantly threatened. This is because it helps accident analysts look for as 
many different plausible causal factors and their relationships as possible for an accident 
based on the comprehensive set of probable causal factors offered from HFACS, the PSFs 
matching table, and the models of activities related to the accident. Assessing the content 
validity of the proposed method empirically will be also a future research issue. When it 
comes to the construct validity, its assessment would be the most difficult at this time. 
Accident investigations using the proposed method that will be accumulated for a long time 
would give a reasonable indicator for the construct validity. However, HFACS was 
developed on a Reason’s framework of accident causation and has been a popular method 
for accident analysis in several work domains; the AT-based method was also developed on 
a sound theoretical model about human activities in a context. In addition, the proposed 
method has several characteristics for supplementing the drawbacks of traditional 
approaches. Considering these points, we can cautiously say that the construct validity of the 
proposed method would not be so problematic.  
Besides the issue of the reliability and validity, this study has some weak points to be 
noted and further studied. It is sure that the effective use of the proposed method requires 
analysts to understand several theoretical frameworks and concepts. In addition, one may 
think that it is not efficient for accident investigation because its use is too complex. However, 
considering the purposes of investigating accidents, we can say that accident investigation 
should be thorough at any cost, even if it takes much effort and time. Nonetheless, the 
development of more detailed procedure and guidance for using the proposed method 
would be a meaningful work for enhancing its practicality. The proposed method was not 
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developed for a particular work domain, and its use does not need any work domain 
characteristics. Because the conceptual underpinnings of the proposed method can be 
applied to any work domain, it is expected that it would be used for any human-related 
accident in a complex system. However, HFACS was originally developed in aviation 
industry and most of the causal factors were developed to reflect the accident characteristics 
of aviation industry, and the probable causal factors of the PSFs matching table for using the 
AT-based method are not a complete set. Accordingly, it would be necessary to modify the 
causal factors of HFACS and supplement the PSFs matching table when applying the 
proposed method to a specific work domain. In association with this, it will be meaningful to 
develop more case studies in a range of work domains.  
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Appendix A. Linking between the elements of activity system model and 
performance shaping factors 
 
This appendix describes the PSFs matching table which links the elements of activity system 
model and performance shaping factors to facilitate the effective use of the AT-based method. 
However, it should be noted that this is not a complete listing, rather an example of using the 
concepts of the AT-based method when identifying plausible causal factors. 
 
Activity System 
Elements Performance Shaping Factors (Examples) 
Subject 
▪ Personality (e.g., under-confidence, complacency, self-esteem) 
▪ Mental states (e.g., mental fatigue, stress, inattention) 
▪ Physical states (e.g., physical fatigue, illness) 
Object 
▪ Number of simultaneous goals 
▪ Task characteristics (e.g., urgency, risk level, the time available) 
▪ Systems or components to be handled for a task 
Subject-Object 
▪ Risk perception 
▪ Domain expertise level (e.g., knowledge and skills for a job) 
▪ Negative transfer of prior knowledge or skills 
Tool 
▪ (Some part of) usability of tools/equipment (e.g. visibility) 
▪ Technical failures of tools/equipment 
▪ Level of detail of procedures/documents 
▪ Technical correctness of procedures/documents 
Subject - Tool 
▪ Knowledge and skills of using tools/equipment/procedures 
▪ (Some part of) usability of tools/equipment (e.g. compatibility 
with user’s expectation) 
▪ Usability of procedures (e.g, readability, clarity) 
Tool - Object 
▪ Availability of tools/equipment/procedures 
▪ (Some part of) usability of tools/equipment (e.g. task difficulty) 
Community 
▪ Leadership of supervisors 
▪ Team composition 
Subject - 
Community 
▪ Delegation of authority 
▪ Rewards and punishments 
Community - 
Object 
▪ The level of staffing and qualification 
▪ Teamwork for a task 
▪ Clearness in roles and responsibilities 
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Activity System 
Elements Performance Shaping Factors (Examples) 
Rule 
▪ Work practices 
▪ Adequacy of policy and guidance 
▪ Organisational customs 
Div. of labour 
▪ Adequacy of coordination or communication 
▪ Level of supervision 
Subject - Rule 
▪ Sense of responsibility 
▪ Commitment to leadership 
Community - 
Rule 
▪ Team cohesiveness and collaboration 
▪ Team or organizational climate 
Object - Div. of 
labour 
▪ Adequacy of distributed workload 
▪ Gap between roles and capabilities 
Community - Div. 
of labour 
▪ Role awareness 
▪ Gap between roles and preference (or motivation) 
Subject - Another 
activity 
▪ (Some part of) selection and placement 
▪ Management of fitness-for-duty (e.g., drug, alcohol, fatigue) 
▪ Adequacy of training 
Tool - Another 
activity 
▪ Design control of tools/equipment (e.g., requirement, V&V) 
▪ Provision of required tools/equipment 
▪ Management of technical documents 
Object - Another 
activity 
▪ Adequacy of work planning or control 
▪ Adequacy of risk assessment 
Community - 
Another activity 
▪ (Some part of) selection and placement 
▪ Crew resource management 
▪ (Some part of) organizational change management (e.g., job 
rotation) 
Rule - Another 
activity 
▪ Adequacy of organisational culture assessment 
▪ Adequacy of policy making process 
Div. of labour - 
Another activity 
▪ Adequacy of protocols or methods for communication and 
instruction 
▪ (Some part of) organizational change management (e.g., division 
of responsibility) 
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